Resumen:
The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of N strategic agents is smaller than the least-cost solution by a factor of (N/(N+1)). Market power analysis for multiple stages was then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme, where the decision in each stage and state is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented.
Palabras Clave: hydrothermal scheduling, stochastic optimization, market power, game theory, Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Índice de impacto JCR y cuartil WoS: 0,258 (2002); 4,400 - Q1 (2023)
Referencia DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021537910823
Publicado en papel: Noviembre 2002.
Cita:
L.A. Barroso, M. Fampa, R. Kelman, M. V. Pereira, P.R. Lino, Market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal dispatch. Annals of Operations Research. Vol. 117, nº. 1-4, pp. 247 - 270, Noviembre 2002.
